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Abstract
The concept of an effectivity function is adopted as a formal model of a constitution. A game
form models the actions available and permissible to individuals in a society. As a representation
of the constitution such a game form should endow each group in society with the same power as
it has under the constitution. Another desirable property is Nash consistency of the game form:
whatever the individual preferences, the resulting game should be minimally stable in the sense of
possessing a Nash equilibrium. A first main result of the paper is a characterization of all
effectivity functions that have a Nash consistent representation for the case without special
structure on the set of alternatives (social states). Next, a similar result is derived for the case
where the set of alternatives is a topological space and the effectivity function is topological. As a
special case, veto functions are considered. Further results concern Pareto optimality of Nash
equilibrium outcomes. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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JEL classification: O25; O26
1. Introduction
The fascinating debate on the formalization of rights and constitutions which has
taken place over the past decades shows that at least three constituents are inextricably
*Corresponding author. Tel.: 131-43-388-3288; fax: 131-43-388-4874.
E-mail addresses: pelegba@math.huji.ac.il (B. Peleg), h.peters@ke.unimaas.nl (H. Peters),
t.storcken@ke.unimaas.nl (T. Storcken).
0165-4896/02/$ – see front matter Ó 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PI I : S0165-4896( 01 )00095-6
268 B. Peleg et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 43 (2002) 267 –287
bound up with these concepts: rights and constitutions by themselves; preferences of
society members; and choices that society members can make.
Arrow (1967) defines a constitution as a ‘well-behaved’ social welfare function.
According to this definition, a constitution is viewed as a social decision process
strongly connected with individual preferences. As Arrow (1967, in particular p. 231)
indicates, a difficulty arising from this definition is that social decision processes are
subject to Arrow’s impossibility theorem in social choice. Sen (1970, and many
subsequent papers) adopts the idea of a ‘recognized personal sphere’ and requires that
for every individual in society there should be at least one couple of social states over
which that individual should be decisive. This individual right is imposed as a condition
on a social choice function and, in this respect, Sen’s approach has with Arrow’s in
common that it is based on individual preferences. Sen’s ‘impossibility of a Paretian
liberal’, which shows that individual rights are in conflict with Pareto optimality, has
triggered a stream of literature discussing this genuine paradox. One of the focal points
of this discussion is the distinction that can be made between individual rights—choices
that the individual should have, and choices that the individual actually has—actions that
he can take. In the well-known blue and white shirt example (in a somewhat different
form proposed by Gibbard, 1974) each of two individuals can choose to wear either a
white or a blue shirt. Sen’s individual right condition would require an individual to be
decisive, e.g. over the two social states in which the other individual wears blue, but this
does not concur with the actual choices that are available and that, intuitively, constitute
individual rights as well. For a detailed discussion of this so-called Gibbard paradox, see
Gaertner et al. (1992).
Following Sugden (1985), Gaertner et al. (1992) proposed the use of game forms in
order to formalize the idea of rights. In a game form, each individual chooses from a set
of strategies. These strategies are the available as well as permissible actions and
correspond to the rights of the individuals. An outcome function then chooses a social
state for each combination of strategies. By adding the individual preferences, a game is
obtained. In this approach there is a clear distinction between rights and preferences, but
less so between rights and available choices. The right not to be killed could be modeled
by not allowing murder as an available strategy for any of the individuals, but things are
not always that simple. How about an individual’s right to a minimum subsistence level?
Trying to avoid such questions already seems a sufficient reason to further distinguish
between rights and choices as well.
¨In the present paper we will follow the approach initiated by Gardenfors (1981) and
assume that rights are formalized by an effectivity function. Such a function describes
for every group in society the sets of social states to which this group is entitled by its
own rights. An effectivity function can be formulated independently of preferences and
of choices. We will take it here as a primitive; for a possible foundation on an underlying
constitution, see Peleg (1998). A society cannot function solely on the basis of a
constitution, but additionally needs a collection of rules that delimit the actions available
and permissible to individuals. For instance, freedom of speech is a basic right in most
constitutions, but in practice one needs a set of rules that distinguish between an
individual’s right to express his own opinion on the one hand, and slander or
discrimination on the other hand. Such rules are the legal means to reach social states
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that agree with the constitution. As another example, the right to a minimum subsistence
level may be part of the constitution, but stealing is usually not regarded as a legal way
to reach it. Similarly, we will search for a game form that ‘represents’ the effectivity
function (constitution). The idea of representation will be given a precise meaning: the
game form should endow each individual or group in the society with the same
possibilities as intended by the original constitution. Viewing the game form as a
decentralization of the constitution, no one should lose or gain power. But this is still not
sufficient. Given that in a game form individuals choose their strategies independently,
there is no guarantee that this will lead to a society that is stable, in the sense that no one
would like to change his strategy. Therefore, we will impose the minimum requirement
of Nash consistency: whatever the individual preferences, the resulting game should
have at least one Nash equilibrium. The objective, then, of the present paper is to find
necessary and sufficient conditions on an effectivity function to have a Nash consistent
representation.
In more detail, the contents of the paper are as follows. After introducing definitions
and notations in Section 2, in Section 3 we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
Nash consistent representation for the case in which there is no special structure imposed
on the set of alternatives (i.e. social states). In Section 4 the set of alternatives is a
topological space, and Nash consistent representation of topological effectivity functions
is characterized. In Section 5 these results are applied to the special case of veto
functions. Section 6 concludes. In Appendix A of the paper we present the construction
of the game form that underlies all our representation results. This game form is of
independent interest. It is maximal in the sense that, for any preferences, it allows for at
least as many Nash equilibrium outcomes as any other representing game form. A
surprising consequence of this will turn out to be that there is always a Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium outcome.
Apart from the references mentioned, other related papers include the following. For
the unstructured case, Gurvich (1976, 1989) characterizes Nash consistent game forms
for two individuals; see also Abdou (1995a,b). One of the early papers on topological
effectivity functions is Keiding (1986). Our results on topological effectivity functions
are motivated, in particular, by Abdou (1988). The much stronger condition of
acceptability of a game form, implying not only Nash consistency but also Pareto
optimality of any Nash equilibrium outcome, is studied by Hurwicz and Schmeidler
(1978) and Dutta (1984). Deb et al. (1997) study the relation between Pareto optimality
and other notions of equilibrium in game forms modeling rights. Implementation of a
constitution is studied in Peleg and Winter (2000).
2. Definitions and notations
Throughout this paper, A denotes the set of alternatives. The set A may be finite or
infinite; however, if A is finite, then uAu $ 2. (If D is a finite set, then uDu is the number
of members of D.) A preference ordering on A is a complete and transitive binary
relation. The set of all preference orderings on A is denoted by W 5 W(A). If R [ W and
x, y [ A, then we write xPy if xRy and not yRx. If a [ A and R [ W, then L(a,
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R) 5 hb [ AuaRbj is the lower contour set of a, i.e. the set of alternatives not strictly
Spreferred to a. For a set S, W 5 h f u f : S fi Wj is the set of mappings from S to W.
For a set D, we denote by P(D) the set of all subsets of D, and by P (D) the set of all0
nonempty subsets of D. A structure on the set A of alternatives is a subset 7 of P (A)0
that satisfies: (i) A [ 7 ; (ii) haj [ 7 for all a [ A; and (iii) if B , B [ 7 and1 2
B > B ± 5, then B > B [ 7. Special structures that will be considered in this paper1 2 1 2
are: the set of all nonempty subsets of A; and the set of all nonempty closed subsets of
A, where A is a topological space. The basic representation result Theorem A.1 in
Appendix A holds for any structure.
Let N 5 h1, . . . , nj be the set of players, and let 7 be a structure on the set of
alternatives A. An effectivity function (EF) is a function E: P(N) fi P(7 ) that satisfies
the following conditions: (i) E(N) 5 7 ; (ii) E(5) 5 5; and (iii) A [ E(S) for all
S [ P (N). As a general interpretation, B [ E(S) means that coalition S can force the0
final alternative to be an element of B. The interpretation of the three conditions is fairly
obvious.
An effectivity function E is superadditive if it satisfies the following condition: if
S [ P (N) and B [ E(S ) for i 5 1, 2, and S > S 5 5, then B > B [ E(S < S ). Thei 0 i i 1 2 1 2 1 2
effectivity function E is monotonic if
[B [ E(S), B* [ 7, B # B*, and S # S*] Þ B* [ E(S*).
Monotonicity and superadditivity of effectivity functions are natural properties in view
of the interpretation given above. Moreover, effectivity functions derived from game
forms (see below) have these properties.
The polar of E is the effectivity function E* defined by: E*(5) 5 5, and for S [ P (N)0
E*(S) 5 hB [ 7 uB > B9 ± 5 for all B9 [ E(N\S)j.
Thus, if B [ E*(S), then the complementary coalition N\S cannot guarantee that the final
alternative is not in B. E is maximal if E is superadditive and E 5 E*.
ˆLet E : P(N) fi P(7 ) be a function (not necessarily an effectivity function) that
N N
ˆsatisfies E(5) 5 5. The core of E with respect to R [ W is defined in the following
N
way. Let B [ 7, S [ P (N), and x [ A\B. We say that B dominates x via S at R if0
i N
ˆB [ E(S) and bP x for all b [ B and i [ S. Also, x [ A is dominated at R if there exist
N
ˆB [ 7 and S [ P (N) such that B dominates x via S at R . The core of E with respect to0
N N N
ˆ ˆR , C(E, R ), is the set of all undominated alternatives at R . For Q # W, we say that E
N N N N
ˆis stable on Q if C(E, R ) ± 5 for all R [ Q . For later reference, we also introduce
N
ˆthe Pareto optimal set PO(E, R ), which consists of all x [ A that are not dominated via
N.
We now turn to define some basic properties of game forms. A game form (GF) is an
1 n i(n 1 2)-tuple G 5 (S , . . . , S ; p ; A), where (i) S is the (non-empty) set of strategies
1 n
of player i [ N; and (ii) p : S 3 ? ? ? 3 S fi A is the outcome function. For S [
S i N N NP (N) we denote S 5 3 S . Also, we denote S 5 S . Let R [ W . The pair (G,0 i[S
NR ) defines, in an obvious way, a game in strategic form. A strategy combination s [ S
Nis a Nash equilibrium (NE) of (G, R ) if
i i i N \hi j i[t [ S , i [ N] Þ p(s)R p(s , t ).
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N \hi j N(Here s is the restriction of s to N\hij.) The set of all Nash equilibria of (G, R ) is
N N Ndenoted by NE(G, R ). For Q # W, G is Nash consistent on Q if NE(G, R ) ± 5 for
N N
every R [ Q .
1 nLet G 5 (S , . . . , S ; p ; A) be a game form and assume that p is surjective. The
G
effectivity function E , associated with G, is defined in the following way. For
S S SS [ P (N) and B [ P (A), S is effective for B if there exists s [ S such that p(s ,0 0
N \S N \S N \S G Gt ) [ B for all t [ S . Then E is defined by E (5) 5 5 and
GE (S) 5 hB [ P (A)uS is effective for Bj, for S [ P (N).0 0
G G(E is defined in Moulin and Peleg (1982) where it is called the a-EF of G.) Clearly, E
is superadditive and monotonic. Let 7 be a structure on A and let E: P(N) fi P(7 ) be
G
an effectivity function. A game form G is a representation of E if E(S) 5 E (S) > 7 for
every S [ P (N). Basically, this means that the game form distributes the same power0
among the players as the effectivity function does.
Notational convention: instead of E(hij) and E*(hij) we usually write E(i) and E*(i).
3. Existence of Nash consistent representations: the unstructured case
In this section we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
Nash consistent representation of an effectivity function for the case where there is no
special structure on the set of alternatives A, i.e. 7 5 P (A). An example is the classical0
model of social choice where A is finite. See also Examples 3.9 and 3.10.
Let E: P(N) fi P(P (A)) be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function. We0
ˆassociate with E a function E : P(N) fi P(P (A)) in the following way:0
E*(i), if S 5 hij, i [ N
ˆ hAj, if uSu . 1, S # NE(S) 555, if S 5 5.
ˆThe function E is called the residual of E. The importance of this function can be seen
from the following lemma. Observe that, by Theorem A.1 in Appendix A, E has a Nash
consistent representation if, and only if, E(N\hij) is in a specific sense ‘large’ for every
ˆi [ N. Consequently, the polar E*(i) should be ‘small’, which allows E to have a
nonempty core for every preference profile. The following lemma makes these intuitions
precise.
ˆLemma 3.1. E has a Nash consistent representation if, and only if, E is stable.
1 nProof. Necessity: let G 5 (S , . . . , S ; p ; A) be an NC-representation of E, let
N N NR [ W , let s be an NE of (G, R ), and let x 5 p(s). As s is an NE,
i GL(x, R ) [ E (N\hij) 5 E(N\hij) for every i [ N.
i N
ˆHence, A\L(x, R ) [⁄ E*(i) for all i [ N. Thus, x [ C(E, R ).
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N N N
ˆ ˆSufficiency: assume that E is stable. Let R [ W and x [ C(E, R ). Then A\L(x,
i iR ) [⁄ E*(i) for every i [ N. Thus, by definition of E* and monotonicity, L(x, R ) [
E(N\hij) for every i [ N. Hence, by Theorem A.1, E has an NC-representation. h
We mention that for finite A Lemma 3.1 is not entirely new. Danilov and Sotskov (1991,
Chapter 2, Section 2) show that if G is a Nash consistent game form then for every
profile of preference orderings the set of individually rational alternatives in the
associated polar effectivity function is nonempty: this is the only-if implication in
Lemma 3.1. The if-implication can be derived from the proof of their Theorem 2.
Note that the necessity part of the proof of Lemma 3.1 implies that all Nash
N N
ˆequilibrium outcomes of the game (G, R ) are in fact core elements of (E, R ). By going
over the proof of Theorem A.1 it can be checked that for the particular game form G0
constructed in that proof, any core element is also a Nash equilibrium outcome. These
facts are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. Let E: P(N) fi P(P (A)) be an effectivity function. Then0
(i) if E has a Nash consistent representation G with outcome function p, then p(NE(G,
N N N N
ˆR )) # C(E, R ) for all R [ W ;
N N N
ˆ(ii) if E is superadditive and monotonic, and C(E, R ) ± 5 for all R [ W , then
N N N N
ˆp(NE(G , R )) 5 C(E, R ) for all R [ W , where p is the outcome function of G .0 0
This corollary implies in particular that the game form used in Appendix A admits the
maximum number of Nash equilibrium outcomes. The following example shows that the
inclusion in (i) of Corollary 3.2 may be strict.
Example 3.3. Let N 5 h1, 2, 3j, A 5 ha, bj, and consider the ‘king maker’ game form
(Hurwicz and Schmeidler, 1978) G 5 (h2, 3j, ha, bj, ha, bj; p ; A), where p(2, x, y) 5 x
G
and p(3, x, y) 5 y for all x, y [ A. Then, for E 5 E , E(S) 5 P (A) for all S # N with0
ˆuSu . 1. Hence E*(i) 5 hAj for every i [ N. This implies E(S) 5 hAj for all S [ P (N), so0
N N N N N
ˆthat C(E, R ) 5 A for all R [ W . On the other hand, p(NE(G, R )) # PO(R ), which
can be a strict subset of A.
ˆWe will next provide a combinatorial characterization of the stability of E. Firstly, we
enlarge each of the sets E*(i) by adding the intersection of every decreasing collection
of sets in E*(i). The enlarged sets will be denoted by I(E*(i)), i [ N.
Definition 3.4. Let i [ N and B [ P (A). Then B [ I(E*(i)) if there exists a (linearly0
pre-)ordered set (T, K) and a family of sets B [ E*(i), t [ T, such thatt
(i) if u, t [ T and tKu, then B # B ;t u
(ii) B 5 > hB ut [ T j.t
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Note that if the set A is finite, then E*(i) is not only a subset but actually equal to
I(E*(i)) for every i [ N.
ˆThe announced characterization of the stability of E is the following.
ˆLemma 3.5. E is stable if, and only if,
ni i[B [ I(E*(i)) for all i [ N] Þ >B ± 5. (1)
i51
N NProof. Sufficiency: assume that (1) is satisfied and let R [ W . For i [ N let
i iT 5 hx [ AuA\L(x, R ) [ E*(i)j,
i i i i i
and order T by R . For x [ T let B 5 A\L(x, R ). Thenx
i i iB 5 > hB ux [ T j [ I(E*(i)).x
i N i
ˆBy (1), > B ± 5. Clearly, C(E, R ) $ > B .i[N i[N
i iNecessity: suppose that there exist B [ I(E*(i)), i [ N, such that > B 5 5. Fori[N
i i i
every i [ N there exists an ordered set (T , K ) and a decreasing collection B [ E*(i),t
i i i i it [ T , such that B 5 > hB ut [ T j. Define R on A byt
i i i i
xR y Û [for all t [ T : y [ B Þ x [ B ].t t
N i N
ˆThen x [ A is not dominated via i at R if and only if x [ B . Thus, C(E, R )
i# > B 5 5, which completes the proof of the necessity part. hi[N
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.5 now yield the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. Let E: P(N) fi P(P (A)) be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity0
function. Then E has a Nash consistent representation if, and only if, (1) is satisfied.
As mentioned before, if the set of alternatives is finite, then I(E*(i)) 5 E*(i) for every
i [ N. So in that case condition (1) can be simplified. This results in the following
corollary of Theorem 3.6.
Corollary 3.7. Let E: P(N) fi P(P (A)) be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity0
function. If uAu , `, then E has a Nash consistent representation if, and only if,
n
i i[B [ E*(i) for all i [ N] Þ >B ± 5. (2)
i51
Remark 3.8. If the effectivity function E in Corollary 3.7 has a Nash consistent
representation, then the representing game form can be constructed in such a way that it
admits a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium for every profile of preferences. See the end
of Section 4 for details.
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The following two examples are direct applications of Corollary 3.7. Both examples
were originally proposed by Gibbard (1974).
Example 3.9. Two individuals each have a white (w) and a blue (b) shirt (in Gibbard
(1974) the colors refer to wallpaper). Each individual has the right to choose the color of
his own shirt. Thus, N 5 h1, 2j, and the set of alternatives (social states) is
A 5 h(w, w), (w, b), (b, w), (b, b)j,
where for each alternative the first [second] letter refers to the color of the shirt of
individual 1 [2]. For the associated effectivity function E we have (cf. also Peleg, 1998):
E(1) contains all supersets of h(w, w), (w, b)j and h(b, w), (b, b)j; E(2) contains all
supersets of h(w, w), (b, w)j and h(w, b), (b, b)j; and E(N) 5 P (A). For the polar E* we0
have: E*(1) contains all supersets of
h(w, w), (b, b)j, h(w, w), (w, b)j,
h(b, w), (b, b)j, h(b, w), (w, b)j,
and E*(2) contains all supersets of
h(w, w), (b, w)j, h(w, w), (b, b)j,
h(w, b), (b, w)j, h(w, b), (b, b)j.
Clearly, E is superadditive and monotonic. Corollary 3.7 implies that it has a Nash
consistent representation if, and only if, the intersection of any set in E*(1) with any set
in E*(2) is nonempty. Obviously, this condition is not satisfied here. It follows, in
particular, that the game form in which each individual chooses his own shirt, does not
always have a Nash equilibrium. In one version of the so-called Gibbard paradox, player
1 is first of all a conformist, and for the rest prefers white to blue; player 2 also prefers
white to blue but is first of all a nonconformist. This results in the bimatrix game
w b
w 4, 2 2, 3b1 21, 4 3, 1
which does not have a Nash equilibrium.
Example 3.10. In this example there are three players: Angelina (A), Edwin (E), and the
male Judge (J). The set of alternatives is A 5 hs, e, jj, where s means that Angelina stays
single; e that she marries Edwin; and j that she marries the Judge. Each individual has
the right to stay single, and Angelina and Edwin as well as Angelina and the Judge have
the right to marry. For the associated effectivity function (cf. Peleg, 1998) we have:
E(hA, Ej) contains all supersets of hsj and hej; E(hA, Jj) contains all supersets of hsj and
h jj; E(hE, Jj) contains all supersets of hsj; E(A) contains all supersets of hsj; E(E)
contains all supersets of hs, jj; E(J) contains all supersets of hs, ej; and E(hA, E,
Jj) 5 P (A). Clearly, E is superadditive and monotonic. For the polar E* we have: E*(A)0
contains all subsets of A that contain s; E*(E) contains all subsets of A that contain s
and j; and E*(J) contains all subsets of A that contain s and e. Any triple of elements
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from E*(A), E*(E), and E*(J) has at least the alternative s in common. Thus, for this
effectivity function Corollary 3.7 implies the existence of a Nash consistent representa-
tion.
Remark 3.11. Condition (2) is equivalent to
ni i[B [⁄ E(N\hij) for all i [ N] Þ A\ <B ± 5. (3)
i51
This condition is expressed in terms of the original effectivity function E.
The following example shows that (1) cannot be replaced by (2) when A is infinite.
Example 3.12. Let A 5 h1, 2, 3, . . . j and N 5 h1, 2j. Let E: P(N) fi P(P (A)) be given0
by: E(1) 5 hB # AuuA\Bu , `j, and E(2) 5 hB # AuB is an infinite setj. As the reader may
check, E* 5 E. Thus, E*(i) 5 E(i) for i 5 1, 2, and (2) is satisfied. Nevertheless, the
i i
ˆresidual E is not stable: let R , i 5 1, 2, be given by aR b Û a $ b for all a, b [ A. Hence,
by Lemma 3.1, E has no Nash consistent representation. Observe that, indeed, condition
(1) is violated here. For instance, for every natural number t $ 2 the set B : 5 h1, t,t
t 1 1, . . . j is in E*(2), and hence > hB ut $ 2j 5 h1j [ I(E*(2)). However, A\h1j [t
I(E*(1)), so that (1) is violated.
Remark 3.13. Let uAu , ` and let E: P(N) fi P(P (A)) be a superadditive and monotonic0
effectivity function. If n 5 uNu 5 2, then, by (2), E has a Nash consistent representation if
and only if E is maximal, i.e. E 5 E*. However, if n $ 3, then E may have an
NC-representation without being maximal. Indeed, let N 5 h1, 2, 3j and A 5 ha, bj.
Consider the game form G 5 (hT, Bj, hL, Rj, hM , M j; p ; A), where p is given by the1 2
following two matrices:
L R L R
M : T a a M : T b bS D S D1 2
B a b B b a
GThen G is Nash consistent. However, E 5 E is not maximal: E(3) 5 E(h1, 2j) 5 hAj.
4. Nash consistent representation of topological effectivity functions
Throughout this section the set of alternatives A is a topological space. The structure
on A is
_ 5 _(A) 5 hB [ P (A)uB is closedj.0
As before, let N be the set of players. An effectivity function E: P(N) fi P(_(A)) is
called topological. A preference ordering R on A is continuous if for every a [ A the
sets hb [ AuaRbj and hb [ AubRaj are closed. We denote by V the set of all continuous
preference orderings on A.
The main purpose of this section is to look for necessary and sufficient conditions for
Nash consistent representation of topological effectivity functions. The following result
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provides a necessary condition for the case where A is a normal space, i.e. for every pair
of disjoint closed sets B and B9 there are disjoint open sets U and U 9 with B # U and
B9 # U 9. The necessary condition is analogous to the one used in the finite case, namely
(2).
Theorem 4.1. Let A be a normal space and let the topological effectivity function E
Nhave a Nash consistent representation on V . Then
i i[B [ E*(i) for all i [ N] Þ >B ± 5. (4)
i[N
1 n N iProof. Let G 5 (S , . . . , S ; p ; A) be an NC representation of E on V . Let B [ E*(i)
ifor every i [ N. Assume, contrary to what we want to prove, that > B 5 5. Theni[N
i i ithere exists a family of open neighbourhoods U of B with > U 5 5. Byi[N
i iUrysohn’s Lemma there are continuous functions f (i [ N) which are equal to 1 on B
i i
and equal to 0 outside U . Consider the (continuous) preferences induced by the f (also
idenoted by f ) and let s be a Nash equilibrium in the associated game with outcome
i i i
x 5 p(s). Since > U 5 5, there exists i [ N with x [⁄ U , i.e. f (x) 5 0. Since s isi[N
a Nash equilibrium, we have
i N \hi jhy [ Au there is t [ S with y 5 p(t, s )j
i i# L(x, f ) 5 hy [ Au f ( y) # 0j.
i i i iThis implies that L(x, f ) [ E(N\hij), hence B > L(x, f ) ± 5. Since f is equal to 1 on
i iB and smaller than or equal to 0 on L(x, f ), we have a contradiction. h
The converse of Theorem 4.1 is not true, as the following example shows.
Example 4.2. Let A 5 [0, 1], let N 5 h1, 2, 3j, and let l be the Lebesgue measure on A.
Consider a topological EF on A satisfying: E(N) 5 _(A); E(S) 5 hB [ _(A)ul(B) . 1/3j,
if uSu 5 2; E(i) 5 hAj for every i [ N; and E(5) 5 5. In this case, E*(i) 5 hB [ _ ul(B) $
2/3j for every i [ N, and (4) is satisfied. Consider the following three functions defined
1 2 3
on A: u (x) 5 x, u (x) 5 1 2 x, and u (x) 5 max(1/2 2 x, x 2 1/2). Define the profile
N NR [V by
i i i
xR y Û u (x) $ u ( y), for all x, y [ A and all i [ N.
iAs may be verified, there is no point a [ A such that l(L(a, R )) . 1/3 for i 5 1, 2, 3.
See Fig. 1. Hence, Theorem A.1 implies that E has no Nash consistent representation.
In order to formulate sufficient conditions for Nash consistent representation of a
1topological effectivity function, we introduce the following continuity notion. Here, a
chain hB(a)ua [ Ij (where I is an arbitrary index set) is a collection of subsets of A with
B(a) # B(b ) or B(b ) # B(a) for all a, b [ I.
1Condition (5) is implied by the assumption that every E(N\hij) is closed in the upper topology. See Klein and
Thompson (1984, Chap. 1).
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Fig. 1. The utility functions in Example 4.2.
For every chain hB(a) ua [ Ij:
(5)
B(a) [ E(N\hij) for all a [ I implies > B(a) [ E(N\hij).a [I
Theorem 4.3. Let A be a compact space and let E: P(N) fi P(_(A)) be a superadditive
and monotonic effectivity function satisfying (5). Assume that (4) is satisfied. Then E
Nhas a Nash consistent representation on V .
Proof. We will show that E satisfies condition (I.2) of Theorem A.1 (where 7 5 _(A)
N N i
and Q 5V ). Let R [V . For every i [ N, denote by B the set
iha [ AuL(a, R ) [ E(N\hij)j.
i iThe sets L(a, R ) (a [ B ) form a chain of closed subsets of A. By (5), the intersection
i iF of these sets is an element of E(N\hij). By continuity of the preference R the compact
i i i i i i
set F has a maximal (with respect to R ) element x . Then F 5 L(x , R ) and
i i iB 5 ha [ AuaR x j.
i iWe claim that B [ E*(i) for every i [ N. Since B is a closed set, we only need to
i
verify that B > B9 ± 5 for every B9 [ E(N\hij). Let x9 be a maximal element of (the
i i
compact set) B9 with respect to (the continuous preference) R . Then B9 # L(x9, R ). By
i i i
monotonicity of E, also L(x9, R ) [ E(N\hij). Hence x9 [ B by definition of B . Since
i
also x9 [ B9 we have B > B9 ± 5 as required.
i iSince B [ E*(i) for every i [ N, (4) implies the existence of an x [ > B . Thus,i[N
iL(x, R ) [ E(N\hij) for every i [ N, so that condition (I.2) of Theorem A.1 is
satisfied. h
ˆRemark 4.4. Let the residual E : P(N) fi P(_(A)) be defined similarly as in Section 3:
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E*(i), if S 5 hij, i [ N
ˆ hAj, if uSu . 1, S # NE(S) 5 (6)55, if S 5 5.
Suppose A is a Hausdorff compact space (hence, normal) and suppose that E satisfies
(5). Firstly, if (4) is satisfied, then the element x [ A as obtained in the proof of
N
ˆ ˆ ˆTheorem 4.3 is also in the core C(E, R ); so E is stable. Secondly, let E be stable and
i
suppose there are B [ E*(i) (i [ N) with empty intersection. Then we can construct
ipreferences f as in the proof of Theorem 4.1; since, for every x [ A there is an i with
i N
ˆ ˆx [⁄ B we have C(E, f ) 5 5, contradicting the stability of E. Summarizing, for a
ˆHausdorff compact space A and assuming (5), stability of the residual E is equivalent to
(4).
Remark 4.5. An effectivity function E is called (1, n 2 1)-maximal if E(i) 5 E*(i) for
every i [ N. Theorem 4.3 implies that a (1, n 2 1)-maximal, monotonic, superadditive
topological effectivity function satisfying (5), has a Nash consistent representation if A
is compact. Cf. Moulin and Peleg (1982) and Keiding and Peleg (1999), where
(stronger) maximality conditions are used to obtain representations that are strong Nash
and coalition-proof Nash consistent, respectively.
ˆJust as in Section 3, Corollary 3.2, further properties of the core of the residual E (see
(6)) can be established. In particular, this core contains the Nash equilibrium outcomes
of any Nash consistent representing game form, with equality for the game form G0
constructed in the proof of Theorem A.1. So this last game form is maximal in the sense
that it does not preclude any potential Nash equilibrium outcome. The following
corollary, which coincides with Corollary 3.2 if the number of alternatives is finite,
summarizes these observations.
Corollary 4.6. Let E: P(N) fi P(_(A)) be an effectivity function. Then
(i) if E has a Nash consistent representation G with outcome function p, then p(NE(G,
N N N N
ˆR )) # C(E, R ) for all R [V ;
N
ˆ(ii) if A is compact and E is superadditive, monotonic, satisfies (5), and C(E, R ) ± 5
N N N N N N
ˆfor all R [V , then p(NE(G , R )) 5 C(E, R ) for all R [V , where p is the0
outcome function of G .0
N N N i GProof. (i) Let R [V , s [ NE(G, R ), and y 5 p(s). Then L( y, R ) [ E (N\hij) 5
iE(N\hij) for every i [ N. Thus, if i [ N and B [ E*(i), then B > L( y, R ) ± 5. This
N N
ˆimplies that, for every i [ N, y is not dominated via hij at R . Hence, y [ C(E, R ). (ii)
This follows from Remark 4.4 and the proofs of Theorems 4.3 and A.1. h
ˆA further, rather surprising, property of the core of the residual E is that it always
contains a Pareto optimal outcome.
N NTheorem 4.7. Let the conditions of Theorem 4.3 be satisfied. Then for every R [V
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N N
ˆC(E, R ) > PO(R ) ± 5.
N N iProof. Let R [V . Let, for every i [ N, the point x be as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Then one easily verifies that
N i i
ˆC(E, R ) 5 hx [ AuxR x for all i [ Nj.
N
ˆ ˆSince A is compact and C(E, R ) is nonempty and closed, this identity implies that C(E,
NR ) has an undominated element with respect to the (continuous) Pareto ordering which
N N
ˆis also undominated in A, hence C(E, R ) > PO(R ) ± 5. h
An interesting implication of Theorem 4.7 and Corollary 4.6, part (ii), is that the game
form G constructed in the proof of Theorem A.1 admits a Pareto optimal Nash0
equilibrium for every profile of preferences. Note, furthermore, that Theorem 4.7 and
this last remark hold, in particular, if the number of alternatives is finite (cf. Remark
3.8).
5. Topological veto functions
In this section the results of Section 4 will be applied to topological veto functions. In
order to facilitate the general discussion, the case in which the set of alternatives is finite
will be treated first. As before, N is the set of players.
5.1. The case uAu , `
Let the set of alternatives A be finite with uAu 5 m $ 2. A veto function is a function v:
P(N) fi h 2 1, 0, . . . , m 2 1j such that v(5) 5 2 1, v(S) $ 0 if S ± 5, and v(N) 5 m 2 1.
The interpretation of the number v(S) is that the coalition S can veto any subset of
alternatives with at most v(S) elements. More formally, this is captured by defining an
associated neutral (i.e. not depending on the names of the alternatives) effectivity
function E byv
E (S) 5 hB [ P (A)uuA\Bu # v(S)j 5 hB [ P (A)uuBu $ m 2 v(S)jv 0 0
for every S [ P(N). Conversely, as the reader may check, every neutral effectivity
function is derived from some veto function. A veto function is monotonic if
[S, S* [ P(N), S # S*] Þ v(S) # v(S*),
and it is superadditive if
[S, S* [ P(N), S > S* 5 5] Þ v(S) 1 v(S*) # v(S < S*).
The interpretations of these properties are obvious: monotonicity means that larger
coalitions have more power and superadditivity means that the union of disjoint
coalitions has additional power compared to the coalitions operating separately. Clearly,
a veto function is monotonic [superadditive] if, and only if, the associated effectivity
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function is monotonic [superadditive]. The existence of a Nash consistent representation
for such an effectivity function can easily be characterized by applying Corollary 3.7.
Theorem 5.1. Let A be a finite set of m $ 2 alternatives, and let v: P(N) fi h 2 1, 0, . . . ,
m 2 1j be a monotonic and superadditive veto function. Then the associated effectivity
function E has a Nash consistent representation if, and only if,v
Ov(N\hij) . n(m 2 1) 2 m. (7)
i[N
Proof. For every i [ N,
*E (i) 5 hB [ P (A)uuBu $ v(N\hij) 1 1j.v 0
Hence, (2) is satisfied if, and only if,
O (m 2 [v(N\hij) 1 1]) , m,
i[N
which is (7). h
5.2. General topological veto functions
Let A be a compact metric space with metric d, let @ be the s-algebra of Borel sets
of A, and let m be a probability measure on (A, @ ). A veto function is now a function v:
P(N) fi [21, 1] with v(5) 5 2 1, v(N) 5 1, and v(S) $ 0 if S ± 5. The interpretation is
similar as in the finite case: coalition S can veto any subset of measure at most v(S).
Formally, the associated effectivity function E will be restricted to closed sets:v
E (S) 5 hB [ _(A)um(B) $ 1 2 v(S)j.v
Our approach here is motivated by Abdou (1988).
The definitions of monotonicity and superadditivity are identical to the earlier
definitions for the finite case. Monotonicity of the veto function implies monotonicity of
the associated effectivity function, as is easy to check. For superadditivity this
implication does not hold, as the following examples show.
Example 5.2.
(a) Let A 5 [0, 1 /2] < [1, 3 /2]; m 5 l, where l is the Lebesgue measure; N 5 h1, 2j;
and let v: P(N) fi [21, 1] be given by: v(5) 5 2 1; v(h1j) 5 v(h2j) 5 1/2; and
v(N) 5 1. Then v is monotonic and superadditive. However, E is not superadditive:v
[0, 1 /2] [ E (h1j), [1, 3 /2] [ E (h2j), and [0, 1 /2] > [1, 3 /2] 5 5.v v
(b) Let A 5 [0, 2]; m(B) 5 l(B > [0, 1]) for every Borel set B of A; N 5 h1, 2j;
v(5) 5 2 1; v(h1j) 5 0; and v(h2j) 5 v(N) 5 1. Then v is superadditive and mono-
tonic. Now [3/2, 2] [ E (h2j), [0, 1] [ E (h1j), and [0, 1] > [3 /2, 2] 5 5. Thus,v v
again, E is not superadditive.v
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In Example 5.2(a), the set A is not connected, and in Example 5.2(b), the support of
m, supp(m), is not the whole set A. It turns out that, if these properties are avoided, then
the associated effectivity function is superadditive if the veto function is.
Lemma 5.3. Let A be connected and A 5 supp(m), and let v be superadditive. Then Ev
is superadditive.
Proof. Let S [ P (N), i 5 1, 2, S > S 5 5, and B [ E (S ), i 5 1, 2. Then B [ _(A)i 0 1 2 i v i i
for i 5 1, 2, and
m(B ) $ 1 2 v(S ), m(B ) $ 1 2 v(S ).1 1 2 2
Therefore,
m(B ) 1 m(B ) 5 m(B > B ) 1 m(B < B )1 2 1 2 1 2
$ 2 2 v(S ) 2 v(S ) $ 2 2 v(S < S ).1 2 1 2
Thus,
m(B > B ) $ 1 2 v(S < S ) 1 1 2 m(B < B ) $ 1 2 v(S < S ). (8)1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Thus, E is superadditive if we show that B > B ± 5. Suppose this is not the case, i.e.v 1 2
B > B 5 5. Then, by (7), m(B < B ) 5 1. Hence, B < B 5 A because A 5 supp(m).1 2 1 2 1 2
But this contradicts the connectedness of A. h
The first main result in this section is the following theorem, which gives a sufficient
condition for the effectivity function associated with a topological veto function to have
a Nash consistent representation.
Theorem 5.4. Let A be a compact and connected metric space and let m be a
probability measure on (A, @ ) with supp(m) 5 A. Let v be a monotonic and
superadditive veto function satisfying
nOv(N\hij) $ n 2 1. (9)
i51
NThen the associated effectivity function E has a Nash consistent representation on V .v
For the proof of this theorem we need two lemmas. Assume that the conditions in the
theorem are fulfilled.
Lemma 5.5. Let S [ P (N). Then0
*E (S) 5 hB [ _(A)um(B) $ v(N\S)j. (10)v
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*Proof. First, suppose that B [ _(A) with m(B) , v(N\S). We show that B [⁄ E (S).v
Define
1
]H JB 5 x [ Aud(x, B) $ , t 5 1, 2, . . .t t
`Then B [ _(A) for every t 5 1, 2, . . . , and < B 5 A\B. Hence, there exists a t witht t51 t 0
*m(B ) $ 1 2 v(N\S). Thus, B [ E (N\S) and B > B 5 5. Therefore, B [⁄ E (S).t t v t v0 0 0
*Next, let B [ _ satisfy m(B) $ v(N\S). We assume B [⁄ E (S) and derive a contradic-v
tion. By this assumption there exists B9 [ E(N\S) with B9 > B 5 5. As m(B9) $ 1 2
v(N\S), m(B < B9) 5 1. Hence B < B9 5 A, contradicting the connectedness of A. h
For the next lemma, recall that _(A) with the Hausdorff metric d is a compact metricH
space (Klein and Thompson, 1984, Chapter 4).
Lemma 5.6. E (S) is closed in (_(A), d ) for every S [ P (N).v H 0
Proof. Let a [ [0, 1]. It is sufficient to prove that the set _ * 5 hB [ _(A)um(B) $ aj is
closed in (_(A), d ). To show this, let B(k) [ _ *, k 5 1, 2, . . . , and B 5 lim B(k).H k fi `
For B* # A denote by x the characteristic function of B*, that is, x (x) 5 1 if x [ B*B* B*
and x (x) 5 0 if x [⁄ B*. Then, for x [ B, x (x) 5 1 $ lim sup x (x); and forB* B k fi ` B(k)
x [⁄ B, x (x) 5 0 5 lim x (x). Hence,B k fi ` B(k)
m(B) 5E x (x) dm $E lim sup x (x) dmB B(k)
k fi `
A A
$lim supE x (x) dm 5lim sup m(B(k)) $ a,B(k)
k fi ` k fi `
A
where the second inequality follows from Fatou’s Lemma. Thus, B [ _ *. h
We can now prove Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. The effectivity function E is monotonic because v is monotonicv
and superadditive by Lemma 5.3 because v is superadditive. By Lemma 5.6, E (N\hij) isv
closed in (_(A), d ) for every i [ N, so that in particular (5) is satisfied. In order toH
apply Theorem 4.3 we only have to prove
ni i*[B [ E (i) for all i [ N] Þ >B ± 5.v i51
n
i i*Assume, on the contrary, that there exist B [ E (i), i [ N, such that > B 5 5. Letv i51
i i i n i iD 5 A\B , i [ N. Then each D is open, < D 5 A, and m(D ) # 1 2 v(N\hij) fori51
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n i
every i [ N by Lemma 5.5. By (9), o m(D ) # 1. Because A5supp(m), we musti51
i j 1 nhave D > D 5 5 for all i ± j. Thus, D , . . . , D is a nontrivial open partition of A,
contradicting the connectedness of A. h
Condition (9) in Theorem 5.4 is far from necessary for the existence of a Nash
consistent representation. Let, for instance, A 5 [0, 1] and let m put weight 9 /10 on the
one-point set h1j and distribute weight 1 /10 uniformly over the interval. Consider a
monotonic and superadditive veto function v with v(N\hij) 5 8/10 for every i [ N. Then,
for n . 5, (9) is not satisfied but
*E (N\hij) 5 hB [ _(A)u1 [ Bj 5 E (hij)v v
for every i [ N, so that (4) is satisfied. Hence, Theorem 4.3 still implies that E has av
Nash consistent representation. In this example, the point 1 is an atom of m. For
nonatomic probability measures, indeed, the next theorem shows that (9) is also a
necessary condition.
Theorem 5.7. Let A be a compact metric space and let m be a nonatomic probability
measure on (A, @ ). Let v be a monotonic and superadditive veto function. If the
N
associated effectivity function E has a Nash consistent representation on V , then (9)v
holds.
Proof. Assume, on the contrary, that
O [1 2 v(N\hij)] . 1.
i[N
Let N 5 hi [ Nuv(N\hij) , 1j, hence N ± 5, and choose e . 0 such that0 0
O [1 2 v(N\hij)] . 1 1 ne, where e , minh1 2 v(N\hij)ui [ N j. (11)0
i[N
i i i
ˆ ˆ ˆNext, choose B [ @, i [ N, as follows: if i [⁄ N , then B 5 A; if i [ N , then choose B0 0
i i
ˆ ˆsuch that m(B ) 5 v(N\hij) 1 e and such that > B 5 5. These choices are possiblei[N0
because of nonatomicity of m and (11). As m is a probability measure on (A, @ ), we
ii i i
ˆcan find closed sets B , i [ N, such that: (i) B 5 A if i [⁄ N ; (ii) B # B and0
im(B ) . v(N\hij), for i [ N (see Dunford and Schwartz, 1988, p. 170).0
i i*Thus, we have obtained sets B [ E (i), i [ N, such that > B 5 5. Hence,v i[N
Theorem 4.1 (observing that a metric space is normal) implies that E does not have av
Nash consistent representation. Thus, we have a contradiction, which completes the
proof. h
We end this section with an application of Theorems 5.4 and 5.7.
284 B. Peleg et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 43 (2002) 267 –287
2Example 5.8. In a city occupying an area of 1 km a public facility has to be located.
Assume that there are three parties, N 5 h1, 2, 3j, and each majority of two parties hi, jj
can veto any area of at most 0 # v(hi, jj) # 1. Hence, it is effective for any (closed) area
2
of at least 1 2 v(hi, jj) km . Also, assume that N is effective for any nonempty closed
area. Thus, with v(i) 5 0, i [ N, so that single parties are only effective for the whole
city, we obtain an effectivity function that is monotonic and superadditive. Theorems 5.4
and 5.7 imply that it has a Nash consistent representation if, and only if,
v(h1, 2j) 1 v(h1, 3j) 1 v(h2, 3j) $ n 2 1 5 2.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper the basic assumption was that constitutions can be modeled by effectivity
functions, and the quest was for game forms (modeling the practical implementation of a
constitution) that (i) represent the constitution, i.e. reflect the distribution of power
implicit in the constitution; (ii) are stable in the sense of possessing at least one Nash
equilibrium for any distribution of preferences. The main results are as follows. For
general effectivity functions, i.e. without any special structure on the set of alternatives
(social states), a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a Nash consistent
representation was given in terms of the polar effectivity for individuals: this condition
amounts to the intuitive requirement that individuals should not be too powerful
(condition (1)). A similar result was obtained for the case where the set of alternatives is
a topological space and the effectivity function is topological (condition (4)). For the
special case of topological veto functions (and with some additional requirements on the
set of alternatives) we found as a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash consistent
representation a simple numerical condition on the veto function (condition (9)). We
would like to look upon these results as possibility results, witnessing the examples in
Sections 3 and 5. Moreover, with respect to the Sen paradox we may note that among
the Nash equilibria in the particular representation constructed in Appendix A, there are
always Pareto optimal ones (cf. Remark 3.8, and Theorem 4.7 and the remark following
it).
For the finite case, these results are related to those in Moulin and Peleg (1982), who
consider strong Nash consistent representation and find stability and maximality of the
effectivity function as necessary and sufficient conditions, and Keiding and Peleg
(1999), who consider coalition-proof Nash consistent representation and find maximality
of the effectivity function as a necessary and sufficient condition—given, of course, the
other conditions of monotonicity and superadditivity.
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Appendix A. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash
consistent representation
Let 7 be a structure on the set of alternatives A, and let Q # W. The only further
assumption that we make is that Q is compatible with 7, that is, L(a, R) [ 7 for all
a [ A and R [ Q. As before, N is the set of players.
Theorem A.1. Let E: P(N) fi P(7 ) be an effectivity function. Then E has a Nash
N
consistent representation on Q if, and only if, the following conditions are satisfied:
(I.1) E is superadditive and monotonic.
N N i(I.2) For every R [ Q there exists an x [ A such that L(x, R ) [ E(N\hij) for all
i [ N.
1 nProof. Necessity: let G 5 (S , . . . , S ; p ; A) be a Nash consistent representation of E.
G GBecause E is superadditive and monotonic and E(S) 5 E (S) > 7 for every S [ P (N),0
N N N(I.1) holds. Let R [ Q . As G is Nash consistent on Q , there exists an NE s of (G,
N i GR ). Let x 5 p(s). Because s is a Nash equilibrium, L(x, R ) [ E (N\hij) for every
i Gi [ N. Thus, L(x, R ) [ E (N\hij) > 7 5 E(N\hij) for every i [ N.
Sufficiency: we shall first construct a representation of E on 7. For i [ N let
iN 5 hS # Nui [ Sj and denote
i i iM 5 hm: N fi 7 um(S) [ E(S) for all S [ N j.
A selection from 7 is a function f : 7 fi A such that f(B) [ B for every B [ 7.
1 nDenote by F the set of all selections from 7. We now define a GF G 5 (S , . . . , S ; p ;0
i iA) as follows. The set of strategies of i [ N is the set S 5 M 3 F 3 N. Let s 5
1 n 1 n i i i i(s , . . . , s ) [ S 3 ? ? ? 3 S , where s 5 (m , f , t ) for i [ N. In order to define
p(s) we introduce the following sequence of partitions of N. First, for S [ P (N), we0
define an equivalence relation | on S bys
i ji | j Û m (S) 5 m (S)s
for all i, j [ S, and denote by D(S) 5 D(S, s) the partition of S with respect to | . Nows
let the first partition of N be H (s) 5 hNj. If H (s) 5 hS , . . . , S j is the kth partition,0 k k,1 k,l
where k $ 0, then we define
l
H (s) 5 <D(S ).k11 k,lj51
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Clearly, there exists a minimal r such that H (s) 5 H (s) for all k $ r. Write H (s) 5r k r
ihS , . . . , S j. For each 1 # j # l there exists B [ E(S ) such that m (S ) 5 B for all i [ S .1 l j j j j jl
As E is superadditive, B 5 > B ± 5. Moreover, B [ 7. Let 1 # i # n be thej51 j 0
1 n i0player with i ; (t 1 ? ? ? 1 t ) mod n. Then we define p(s) 5 f (B).0
We now prove that G is a representation of E. Let S [ P (N) and B [ E(S). Choose0 0
i i i is 5 (m , f , t ) for every i [ S such that
i
m (S*) 5 B for all S* $ S and i [ S.
S N \S N \S N \S G0Then, by definition of p, p(s , t ) [ B for all t [ S . Hence B [ E (S) > 7, so
G0E(S) # E (S) > 7.
In order to prove the converse inclusion let C [ 7 \E(S). Then for every B [ E(S),
S SB\C ± 5. Let further s [ S and i [ N\S. (Recall that E(N) 5 7, hence S ± N.)0
i i i i iChoose strategies t 5 (m , f , t ) [ S for every i [ N\S in the following way:
i i i i
m (T ) 5 A for all T [ N and all i [ N\S. Further, [o t 1 o t ]mod n ; i . Leti[S i[N \S 0
S N \S iH (s , t ) 5 hS , . . . , S j. Then N\S # S for some 1 # j # l. Let B 5 m (S ) for i [ Sr 1 l j h h h
l
and h 5 1, . . . , l. Then B 5 A. Hence, by superadditivity of E, B: 5 > B [ E(S).j h51 h
i S N \S G0 0Thus, B\C ± 5. Now take f (B) [ B\C. Then p(s , t ) [⁄ C. Therefore, C [⁄ E (S).
N NIt remains to prove that G is Nash consistent. Let R [ Q . By (I.2) there exists an0
i i i i i i
x [ A such that L(x, R ) [ E(N\hij) for all i [ N. Choose s 5 (m , f , t ) [ S for every
i [ N such that
i(I.3) m (N) 5 hxj for every i [ N.
i j(I.4) m (N\h jj) 5 L(x, R ) for all i [ N\h jj, j 5 1, . . . , n.
N \hi j i i i iClearly, p(s) 5 x and p(s , t ) [ L(x, R ) for all i [ N and t [ S . Thus, s is a
Nash equilibrium. h
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